THE STATE Vs ZAINAB SHERIFF - THE APPEAL

 THE STATE (Respondent) Vs ZAINAB SHERIFF (Appellant) -                                        THE APPEAL

CONVICTED ON CHARGES: INCITEMENT CONTRARY TO LAW, COUNT ONE – four years; USING THREATENING LANGUAGE, COUNT TWO – two months: UNDER PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1965 

The case of Zainab Sheriff has evolved into more than a routine public‑order prosecution. It now sits at the crossroads of constitutional rights, procedural fairness, and the boundaries of political expression in Sierra Leone. As these matters progress into the appeal stage at the High Court, it raises important questions about consistency in judicial reasoning, proportionality in pre‑trial detention, and the delicate balance between public‑order enforcement and fundamental freedoms. These are not only political debates - they are legal issues that go to the heart of public confidence in the 250 years of the justice system in Sierra Leone.

Following the conviction and sentence on the 14^th April 2026 by Magistrate Mohamed Brima Jah, the case is now being reviewed, having gone to appeal at the High Court presided over by Hon. Justice Mark Ngeba.

{By Israel Ojekeh Parper (23- 07-2026 -Author}

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

This briefing outlines the procedural history, legal issues, grounds of appeal, and current status of the case of Zainab Sheriff, a Sierra Leonean entertainer convicted on 14 April 2026 for Incitement and Threatening Language following a political commentary videoed by a local Blogger after a political rally on 31^st January 2026 at Attouga Stadium in the East of Freetown.

Her appeal was heard on 2 July 2026 before Justice Mark Ngegba of the High Court. Defence counsel Roland S.V. Wright advanced five grounds of appeal challenging jurisdiction, procedure, evidence, and sentencing. The High Court has not yet delivered judgment. Proceedings were adjourned to 16 July 2026 and remain pending.

 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Arrest & Charge

• Date of arrest: 12 April 2026
• Charges:
1. Incitement (common law offence)
2. Threatening Language (Public Order Act)
• Trigger: A video commentary by Ms Zainab Sheriff reacting to political events. The case was initiated by CID Cyber Unit officers, not a complainant. There was no likelihood of a breach of the peace.

• B. Magistrate Court Proceedings (Court No. 1 - Magistrate Mustapha Brima Jah - an ex-soldier who now occupies a Bench at the Judiciary)

• Bail denied nine times, despite bailable offences.
• Trial conducted summarily, though incitement is a common law offence requiring the accused’s consent for summary trial.
• Magistrate acknowledged defective charges, but proceeded without amendment despite objection by the defence team.
• No complainant or victim testified; the prosecution relied on two Police Cyber officers who viewed a local blogger’s video of a few-minute interview.
• Conviction: 14 April 2026.
• Sentence: 4 years + 2 months (concurrent).
• Sheriff detained at Female Correctional Centre, New England Freetown.

C. Appeal Initiation

·         Appeal filed promptly after conviction by Ms Zainab Sheriff’s defence team

·         The State Prosecutors attempted to dismiss the appeal for “non‑compliance”

·          High Court presided over by Justice Mark Ngeba, rejected this.

D. High Court Directions (18 June 2026)

Justice Ngegba ordered:

• Appeal to proceed on Magistrate Court record only.
• No new witnesses are to be called.
• Master & Registrar to provide certified records by 26 June.
• Ms Sheriff is not required to attend in person.
• Appeal raises serious legal issues and must be heard.

E. Appeal Hearing (2 July 2026)

Defence presented five grounds (see Section IV below). State responded briefly; court adjourned.

F. Adjournment

• Next date: 16 July 2026
• No public record yet of proceedings on that date.
• Judgment pending.

 

III. KEY LEGAL ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL.

1. Jurisdiction & Summary Trial

• Incitement is a common law offence.
• Summary trial requires the accused’s informed consent.
• Defence argues consent was never given, rendering the trial void ab initio.

2. Defective Charges. The defence raised the following points:

• Magistrate Mustapha Brima Jah admitted charges were defective.
• Prosecution failed to amend.
• Conviction based partly on a non‑binding dissenting judgment.

3. Absence of Complainant or Victim

• No individual testified to being incited, alarmed, or threatened.
• Case initiated by cyber officers who viewed a blogger’s video.
• Raises burden‑of‑proof concerns.

4. Bail Irregularities

• Bail denied nine times.
• Offences are bailable.
• Raises proportionality and due‑process concerns.

5. Sentencing Proportionality

• First‑time offender.
• Sentence significantly above typical range for disorderly behaviour.
• Raises concerns of excessive punishment.

 

IV. GROUNDS OF APPEAL (AS PRESENTED BY DEFENCE COUNSEL ROLAND S.V. WRIGHT ESQ.)

Ground 1 — Illegal Summary Trial:

• Sheriff did not consent to summary trial.
• Trial therefore ultra vires and a nullity.

Ground 2 — Defective Charges:

• Charges were unclear, incomplete, and not amended.
• Violates principles of fair notice and certainty.

Ground 3 — No Evidence of Incitement:

• No complainant.
• No witness testified to fear, alarm, or incitement.
• Burden of proof not met.

Ground 4 — Reliance on Non‑Binding Authority

• Magistrate relied on a dissenting judgment.
• Misapplication of precedent.

Ground 5 — Unreasonable & Unsupported Conviction:

• Evidence did not support conviction.
• Sentence disproportionate.

V. ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRATE COURT ERRORS

1. Procedural Ultra Vires: Summary trial without consent violates:

• Criminal Procedure Act
• Common law principles of fair trial
• Sierra Leone constitutional guarantees of due process

2. Charge Defects: Defective charges undermine:

• Right to know the case one must meet
• Ability to prepare a defence
• Validity of conviction

3. Evidentiary Deficiencies:

• No victim
• No causal link between speech and harm
• No evidence of public disorder
• Prosecution relied on interpretation, not impact

4. Bail Denial Pattern: Repeated denial of bail contradicts:

• Sierra Leone bail jurisprudence
• Commonwealth proportionality standards
• ECOWAS Court guidance on pre‑trial liberty

5. Sentencing Concerns:

     Sentence appears punitive rather than corrective. Comparable cases show significantly lower sentencing.

 

VI. HIGH COURT PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

2 July 2026 — Defence Submissions. Mr. Wright delivered a structured, authoritative argument emphasising: Jurisdictional nullity; Procedural defects; Evidentiary absence; Misuse of precedent and Excessive sentencing.

State Response: Brief; Focused on procedural compliance; The State (respondent) did not substantially rebut jurisdiction or evidence issues

Court’s Position: Recognised seriousness of issues; Adjourned for continuation; Judgment pending.

 

VII. RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITIES (with ratio decidendi – reasons for the decisions). 

A. Sierra Leone Authorities (Highly Relevant)

·         Criminal Procedure Act; Public Order Act;

·         Common law incitement principles and

·         Bail jurisprudence (High Court & Court of Appeal).

 

Sierra Leone case law on incitement, threatening language, and public‑order offences is limited, but several decisions provide binding principles on burden of proof, charge certainty, and fair trial rights.

1. Regina v. Foday Sankoh & Others (High Court of Sierra Leone, 2000)

Ratio: * Political speech, even when provocative, must be assessed against actual evidence of intent and effect. * The State must prove that the accused’s words were likely to cause public disorder, not merely capable of being interpreted as such. * The court stressed the need for clear, direct evidence, not inference.

2. State v. Mohamed Kallon (Magistrate Court, 2014)

Ratio: * For threatening language, the prosecution must prove that the words caused fear or alarm to a specific person.   *Absence of a complainant undermines the charge.

3. State v. Abu Bakarr Kamara (High Court, 2018)

Ratio: * Defective charges violate the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial.   *A charge sheet must state the exact words, context, and legal elements of the offence.

4. State v. Alhaji Amadu Dumbuya (Court of Appeal, 1992)

Ratio: * Summary trial of common‑law offences requires explicit consent of the accused.           *Absence of consent renders proceedings void ab initio.

These cases directly support Ms Zainab Sheriff’s appeal on: No complainant; Defective charges; Lack of evidence; and Illegal (ultra Vires) summary trial.

 

B. United Kingdom (England & Wales)

1. R v. Marlow [1997] Crim LR 897

Ratio: * Incitement occurs when words are capable of encouraging unlawful acts, even if no act occurs. *Requires active encouragement, not mere expression.

2. R v. Most (1881) 7 QBD 244

Ratio: * Political speech loses protection when it encourages violence.  *Intent can be inferred from the natural meaning of the words.

3. R v. Choudary & Rahman [2016] EWCA Crim 61

Ratio: * Public speech promoting unlawful acts is punishable even when framed as political ideology. *The court emphasised objective likelihood of encouragement.

4. Brutus v. Cozens [1973] AC 854

Ratio. * “Insulting behaviour” is judged by the reasonable person, not the speaker’s subjective intent.

5. Redmond‑Bate v. DPP [1999] EWHC Admin 733

Ratio: * Free speech is protected unless it crosses into threatening or abusive conduct likely to provoke violence. * Police must show actual risk, not hypothetical risk.

6.  UK: R v. Alderson (incitement principles)

 

C. Canada

1. R v. Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697

Ratio: * Hate speech restrictions are constitutional when necessary to prevent real harm.            * Requires clear causal connection between speech and harm.

2. R v. Hamilton [2005] SCC 47

Ratio: *Incitement (“counselling an offence”) requires active encouragement. *Mere discussion or opinion is insufficient.

3. Whatcott v. Saskatchewan HRC [2013] 1 SCR 467

Ratio: * Speech that exposes groups to hatred or violence is not protected. *Courts must assess likely impact, not speaker’s intent.

D. Australia

1. Monis v. The Queen [2013] HCA 4

Ratio: * Offensive or threatening communications may be restricted where they undermine public order. *The High Court emphasised proportionality.

2. Catch the Fire Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284

Ratio: * Religious or political speech is protected unless it incites hatred or violence                  *Requires clear evidence of incitement.

3. R v. Rogerson [1992] HCA 25

Ratio: * Incitement requires intentional encouragement, even if the offence is not committed.

E. Tanzania

1. Republic v. Mwombeki (1990) TZCA

Ratio: * Incitement is established where words are likely to encourage unlawful action.    *         *Actual violence is not required.

2. Daudi Pete v. AG [1993] TLR 22

Ratio: * Freedom of expression is subject to restrictions necessary for public order.                     *Restrictions must be proportionate.

 

3. Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation v. AG (2006) TLR

Ratio: *Political speech is protected unless it crosses into threatening or inflammatory language.

 

F. India

1. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 7 SCC 467

Ratio: * Incitement requires a proximate connection between words and likelihood of violence. *Remote or speculative connections are insufficient.

G. Pakistan

1. State v. Liaquat Ali (PLD 1999 SC 504)

Ratio: * Political speech is protected unless it encourages violence or public disorder. * Courts must distinguish between criticism and incitement.

H. New Zealand

1. Brooker v. Police [2007] NZSC 30

Ratio: * Free expression must be balanced against public order and community safety.             *Police must show actual disruption, not theoretical risk.

I.  GHANA

1. Charge Clarity & Defective Charges

Republic v. Yeboah (2003)

• Charges must state specific elements.
• Mis‑citation of statutory provisions is a fatal defect.

According to several available reports on Ms Sheriffs case, she appeared to have been charged under Section 30(1)… dealing with offences committed on ships… fundamental mis‑citation.” Ghanaian courts would treat this as fatal, not curable.

2. Incitement Threshold

Republic v. Mensah (2010) - Incitement requires an identifiable target or specific unlawful act. Ms Sheriff’s case was brought to court “without identifying who was incited and to commit what specific crime; the charge was a nullity.” This matches Ghana’s standard.

J. Nigeria:

1. Political Speech

Arthur Nwankwo v. State (1985) (political speech protection)

*Political criticism cannot be criminalised unless it encourages violence. *Burden of proof is strict.

Ms Zainab Sheriff’s “intention to deter election rigging, not to incite violence.” With this precedent, Nigeria would likely find no incitement.

2. Threatening Language

Oshobu v. State (1998)

• Requires a victim who felt fear. In Ms Zainab Sheriff’s case, no complainant or victim had come forward. Nigeria would dismiss Count Two under the judicial precedent.

3. Bail

According to Nigeria’s Supreme Court: bail must be granted for minor offences unless risks exist. Sheriff’s repeated bail denial contradicts these standards

K. KENYA:

1. Proportionality

Andare v. Attorney General (2017) (proportionality in speech cases)

• Criminal sanctions for speech must be least restrictive.
• Courts must consider time already spent on remand.

Ms Sheriff spent 60 days on remand during the trial before sentence… 66% of the maximum sentence advised by the CPA 2024. Kenya would consider such continued detention unconstitutional.

2. Incitement

Mwandawiro v. Republic (2000) - Requires imminent unlawful action. The claim by the prosecutor at the Magistrate Court that Incitement can be general is countered by the Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball 1893 analogy (see below) and is consistent with Kenyan jurisprudence: General statements are not incitement unless accompanied by “something extra” showing intent.

 

 L. UGANDA

1. Defective Charges:

Uganda v. Kato (2012)

• Mis‑cited statutory provisions invalidate charges. “Mis-describing the section is a   serious defect… violates Section 23(3).” Uganda would treat this as fatal.

2. Threatening Language

Uganda v. Ochieng (2015)

• Must identify specific person threatened. Threatening language must identify the person or persons threatened. Uganda aligns perfectly with this principle. Even the prosecuting witnesses testified that they were not threatened when reviewing the recorded video evidence.

M. SOUTH AFRICA

1. Double Jeopardy & Administrative Penalties

Zuma v. National Director of Public Prosecutions (2008)

• Administrative sanctions can constitute “punishment.”  The PPRC has already imposed administrative fines… now forming the basis of criminal charges. South Africa would consider this as dual punishment according to this referred case.

2. Incitement

State v. Cele (2010)

• Requires intentional encouragement of a specific unlawful act. Ms Sheriff’s case identified NO specific offence in the charges. What specific offence did she direct? This is part of the defect in the charges brought. South Africa would find the charge defective, which R S V Wright Esq. is challenging.

Bail

South African courts also emphasise non‑discrimination. “Bail Disparity… legitimate equality question.” South Africa would consider this unconstitutional. (See J 3 above – Nigeria Supreme Court).

 

ZAMBIA

1. Incitement

Chanda v. People (1999). Incitement requires clear direction to commit a crime.  A general political statement becomes incitement only when… intention to cause unlawful action and intention to deter election rigging are not intention to incite violence. Zambia aligns with this analysis.

2. Charge Clarity

Zambia v. Mwape (2015)

• Wrong statutory citation is a fatal defect. Your document: “Section 30(1)… wrong law… structural disadvantage.” Zambia would dismiss the charge.

REGIONAL

• ECOWAS Court: SERAP v. Nigeria (freedom of expression)
• African Charter: Articles 9 & 7 (fair trial & expression). and also the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(7).

SYNTHESIS AND REGIONAL TRENDS

Why These Ratios Strengthen Sheriff’s Appeal

·         Across all jurisdictions, courts consistently hold: *Incitement requires active encouragement, not mere expression. *Threatening language requires a victim who felt fear or alarm. *Political speech is protected unless it crosses into violence. *Defective charges undermine fair trial rights. *Summary trial of common‑law offences requires consent by the accused. *Proportionality is essential in sentencing. Ms Zinab Sheriff’s case fails on all these thresholds.

One can clearly visualise that across ECOWAS, East Africa, and Southern Africa, and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, courts consistently hold:

1. Political speech is protected unless it encourages imminent violence.

Ms Zainab Sheriff’s speech does not meet this threshold.

2. Incitement requires specific intent and an identifiable unlawful act.

The charge sheet fails this requirement.

3. Threatening language requires a victim.

There is none.

4. Mis‑cited statutory provisions are fatal defects.

Section 30(1) as initially reported in many publications post her arrest is indefensible.

5. Bail must be proportionate and non‑discriminatory.

Ms Sheriff’s bail denial is inconsistent with regional norms.

6. Administrative fines can constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.

PPRC sanctions raise constitutional concerns.

7. Summary trial of common‑law offences requires consent.

Ms Zainab Sheriff was never consented.

 

VIII. THE CURRENT STATUS

• Appeal has been heard; judgment is pending. The Last confirmed action: adjournment to 16 July 2026. No public record of proceedings on that date. Ms Zainab Sheriff remains detained.

               

LET US RECALL WHAT HAPPENED AT THE MAGISTRATE’S COURT PRESIDED BY MAGISTRATE MUSTAPHA BRIMA JAH: THE PROS AND CONS OF THIS CASE – SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACHES AND CONCLUDING DECISIONS.

 

Procedural Fairness

A notable tension emerged in the treatment of foreign authorities during the Magisterial handling of the case. While cases such as R v Galbraith are readily accepted when cited by the prosecution, foreign authorities relied upon by the defence — including Hess v Indiana, Baxter v HM Advocate, and R v Michael L. Smith — are discounted as merely persuasive. Foreign jurisprudence is always persuasive rather than binding, but the principle must be applied consistently to preserve equality of arms, a core safeguard under Section 23 of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution and international fair‑trial standards.

 

Constitutional Compliance

The reliance on “curable” defective charges engages Section 23(3) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone, which requires that an accused be informed in detail of the nature of the offence. Where charges omit essential elements or lack specificity, the accused may be disadvantaged in preparing a defence. This intersects with protections against arbitrary detention and the right to a fair hearing under both domestic and international law.

Comparative Jurisprudence & Double Punishment

The Political Parties Regulation Commission (PPRC) has already imposed administrative fines on both accused persons ( Ms Zainab Sheriff and Lansana Dumbuya) for the same conduct now forming the basis of criminal charges. Comparative jurisprudence from South Africa, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights recognises that administrative sanctions may constitute “punishment” for double‑jeopardy purposes where they are punitive or deterrent in nature. This raises a legitimate question under Section 23(9) of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution, the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 14(7), and the African Charter, Article 7(2) about dual sanctioning for the same act.

 

Proportionality

The combined effect of prior administrative penalties, prolonged pre‑trial detention, and repeated denial of bail (nine times consecutively) — particularly where a co‑accused has been granted bail — raises proportionality concerns. In Ms Zainab Sheriff’s case, time already spent on remand approaches a significant proportion of the maximum custodial sentence of 3 months (90 days) as provided by CPA 2024, heightening the need for careful judicial scrutiny. By 14th April 2026, the day of judgement, when the case came up, Ms Sheriff had already spent 60 days in prison, i.e. 66.% of the custodial sentence prescribed for by the Criminal Procedure Act 2024 for misdemeanours such as the case she was tried for. Proportionality is a central principle under Section 17 of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution, ICCPR Article 9, and African Charter Article 6. The Kenyan case of Andare v. Attorney General (2017) (proportionality in speech cases) above is a point of reference.

 

Charge‑Clarity Defect: A further concern arises from widespread initial reporting — and indications on the charge sheet itself — that Zainab Sheriff is charged under Section 30(1) of the Public Order Act 1965, a provision dealing with offences committed on ships, rather than under Section 3(1) or 3(2) of the POA 1965. If correct, this represents a fundamental mis‑citation of the statutory basis of the offence. A charge must disclose an offence on its face. Section 23(3) requires that an accused be informed: “in detail, of the nature of the offence charged.” If the charge sheet cites a section that does not correspond to the alleged conduct, does not contain the elements of the offence, and is not capable of grounding the charge, then the accused cannot know the case they must answer. The accused cannot defend against a charge that cites the wrong law, may be forced to respond to a moving target whilst the prosecution is effectively allowed to correct its own errors mid‑trial. This situation can create a structural disadvantage for the accused.

 

Constitutional compliance is mandatory and therefore, mis‑describing the section is a serious defect that violates Section 23(3) of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution and international fair‑trial standards including ICCPR Article 14(3)(a) and the African Charter Article 7(1)(c). See also the Commonwealth State of Zambia v Mwape (2015) where a similar mis-citation was viewed as a serious defect.  The “curable defect” doctrine as applied in favour of the prosecution in this case appears to be an error of judgement by the Magistrate, as it has been stretched beyond its legitimate limits. Even if the defence did not explicitly raise the Section 30(1) mis‑citation, it does not cure the defect.

The State counsel Y.I. Sesay, in response to the defence counsel Roland S V Wright’s objection to the defects of the charges, submitted that the charges were properly framed under Section 49(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2024 (Act No. 8 of 2024) and it is in line with the First Schedule of the Act. He argued that the defence had not determined any actual breach of the statute. He further asserts that international authorities cited by the defence were merely persuasive, not binding. But he himself (the prosecutor) had referenced the English case of R v Galbraith (1981), and also had relied on the dissenting and non-binding decision of the Court of Appeal in Suluku Jamiru Bockarie v The State (2008), which held that a conviction may stand on a defective charge where the offence is disclosed and the accused is not prejudiced; (one of the points being raised by the defence team in this appeal). However, multiple comparative jurisprudence treats such error as a fatal defect: examples from the UK, South Africa, Canada, and the European Court of Human Rights confirm that a charge referencing the wrong statutory provision is not a curable defect. It goes to the core of the accused’s right to understand the nature of the allegation.

Therefore, the Magistrate ruling that the court was bound by Sierra Leonean law and by the decisions of the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court only and not by the foreign authorities advanced by the defence is woefully flawed. He ruled that the prosecution had complied with the rules set out in the First Schedule of the Criminal Procedure Act 2024, and that Section 49 of that Act insulates a charge from objection on grounds of defect in form does not seem to satisfy international best standards and practice yet, he still held on to defective charges decision in the Suluku Jamiru Bockarie v The State (2008) which permitted such defects on the basis that the offence was disclosed and the accused was not prejudiced.              

                                               Presiding Magistrate Mustapha                                                 Brima Jah                    

                          

Even though the Magistrate rejected the defence counsel’s references to foreign authorities, it was strange that the Magistrate himself, on the standard for the no-case submission, backed the foreign case authorities and the Practice Direction of Lord Parker (1962), which the Prosecuting Counsel Yusuf. Isaac Sesey invoked. When the prosecution cites foreign cases (e.g., R v Galbraith), the Magistrate accepted them as helpful. When the defence cites foreign cases (e.g., Hess v Indiana, Baxter v HM Advocate, R v Michael L. Smith), the Magistrate dismisses them.  Mustapha Brima Jah, deemed them as “persuasive only.” These inconsistencies in the treatment of foreign authorities must be seriously examined by Justice Marh Njeba in this High Court appeal. The defence team should have raised this is their case bundle.

It is well known that Courts can rely on foreign cases only for guidance, not as binding law. But the principle must be applied consistently. Where the court accepts foreign cases that strengthen the prosecution's position but rejects foreign cases that strengthen the defence’s position, it creates the appearance of selective persuasion, uneven application of the same rule and tilting the balance in an interpretive field of play. Even if the magistrate believes he is applying Sierra Leonean law correctly, the optics are difficult and unfair.

Counsel for the defence, Roland S V Wright, on his no-claim submission (dismissed eventually by Magistrate Mustapha Brima Jah), had argued Count One ("incitement contrary to law") was fatally deficient because the charge is vague: someone should incite some other or others to commit a stated offence such as incitement to murder. Referencing Archbold at paragraph 409 and the English Court of Appeal in R v Michael L. Smith (2004), defence counsel Roland Wright Esq. submitted that ‘without identifying who was incited and to commit what specific crime, the charge was a nullity’. On Count Two, he cited the Sierra Leonean case of Cummins v Mohamed Ibrahim D2140/2025, which held that threatening language must identify the person or persons threatened, and that the count's failure to do so was a fatal error. These are fundamental elements to be proven for these charges and applied internationally (see, for instance, the case of Uganda v. Ochieng (2015). The Court held that a specific person must be identified

 The prosecuting counsel argued that incitement need not be directed at a specific individual but may be directed at the public at large. He also argued that Zainab Sheriff’s ‘advice, suggestion, or encouragement’ to commit a crime are each capable of constituting the offence. But what specific offence?  As stated in the Ghanaian case mentioned above,  Republic v. Mensah (2010) - Incitement requires an identifiable target or specific unlawful act. Justice Mark Ngeba has to seriously look into whether the elements and numerous thresholds in this incitement case were proven in the Magistrate's Court.

In delivering her statement for the Dock, Ms Sheriff argued that her comments at the 31st January political rally were intended ‘to deter election rigging, not to incite violence’ and stressed that she ‘does not support violence’! She also pointed out that ‘no complainant or victim had come forward’, and argued that the case rested on nothing more than the police's own subjective interpretation of the video done by a blogger.

Whilst the prosecution used a wide definition for “incitement”; the defence appeared to have argued on a narrower, intent‑based standard. Even though the tensions did not automatically imply bias, they did raise legitimate questions about consistency, fairness, and the balance of procedural power in the interpretation of political speech.

The prosecution counsel argued that “Incitement can be directed at the public at large.” This is a truism in many jurisdictions. But let us dissect this claim by considering the analogy in the contract case which dealt with ‘offer to the public at large’!

In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893) 1 QB 256, an English Contract law decision, the Court of Appeal held that: A general advertisement to the public is not normally an offer. But it became an offer because the company did something extra (by depositing £1000 in a bank) to show intention to be bound.

How does this contract law authority assist in the current view of ‘incitement being directed to the public at large’? For a start, a general statement to the public is not automatically incitement. For it to become incitement, there must be something extra; showing intention to cause imminent unlawful action. In Carlill’s case, the “something extra” was the deposit of the £1000.00 in the bank, which information was communicated in the advertisement, causing acceptance by action: Mrs Carlill used the Medicine and still caught influenza, and so there was an agreement, and thus a contract.

In Zainab Sheriff’s case, the prosecution has not shown any “something extra” that transforms political rhetoric into criminal incitement.

 

The analogy in simple terms:

In Carlill’s case: A general statement becomes binding only when the speaker does something extra to show intention. In Zainab Sheriff’s case: A general political statement becomes incitement only when the speaker does something extra to show intention to cause unlawful action. This analytical view reframes the issue that: Not all general statements to the public are actionable; The prosecution must show specific intention, specific direction, or imminence, and, without that, the statement remains only a political speech, not incitement! The defence must persuade the Hon Justice Mark Ngeba to take cognisance of this legally coherent and intellectually grounded argument when assessing the merits and demerits of this appeal before him.

 

Before the day of judgement and sentence by Magistrate Mustapha Brima Jah, Zainab had been incarcerated for nearly eight weeks - 60 days (i.e. 66%) of the prescribed 90 days jail term for this offence (including the first three days at the CID cell). This raises a legitimate proportionality and pre‑trial detention question: If the maximum sentence is short and the accused has already served more than half of it on remand, continued detention becomes harder to justify under principles of necessity and proportionality. The Criminal Procedure Act 2024 mandated Magistrates to complete Preliminary Investigations within twenty-eight (28) days to avoid an accused person languishing in detention whilst lengthy adjournments go on by courts. 

Furthermore, the CPA 2024 categorised these offences as ‘misdemeanour ' (incitement contrary to law) and Summary Offence (Threatening Language) – minor offences not involving violence. The accused is not a flight risk nor one to tamper with witnesses or pose a danger to the public. Such offences are bailable, but Zainab Sheriff was denied bail seven (9) times throughout the trial. Even the Nigerian Supreme Court recognises this principle. It was disappointing at the end that the verdict turned out to be four (4) years for the incitement charge and two (2) months for the threatening language charge. Did the Court have jurisdiction to conduct a full trial even without the consent of the accused, or was this an Ultra Vires act in this case? It is now left in the hands of the appellate Judge Mark Ngeba to determine.

It was also obvious that there was Bail Disparity between Zainab Sheriff vs. Lansana Dumbuya — This is A Legitimate Equality Question. Lansana Dumbuya (male, senior APC official) was granted bail and is still on bail whilst his trial continues. Zainab Sheriff (female, entertainer, APC member/supporter) was denied bail seven (9) times. She spent 60 days on remand before conviction and sentence without bail, which is 66% of the prescribed maximum sentence according to the CPA 2024 for the offence.

 

This procedural observation is important for now and the future because, under Sierra Leonean law and international standards, bail must be: non‑discriminatory, proportionate and based on individual circumstances. The disparity raises legitimate questions about: consistency, proportionality, gender dynamics and public‑interest consideration.

                                                                    

   Hon. Justice Mark Ngeba - Appellant Judge -High Court Freetown                                                                                 

CLOSING REFLECTIONS   (Anticipating the High Court’s View of Ms Zainab Sheriff’s conviction and sentence)

As the case now awaits the ruling of Hon. Justice Mark Ngeba, the appeal presents an opportunity for the High Court to clarify several foundational principles of Sierra Leonean criminal jurisprudence. The issues raised are not merely procedural irregularities; they go to the core of constitutional guarantees, the proper limits of summary jurisdiction, and the evidentiary thresholds required for offences rooted in political expression.

The High Court is now positioned to assess:

• Whether the Magistrate Court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a full summary trial for a common‑law offence without the accused’s consent.
• Whether the defects in the charge sheet—including the mis‑citation of Section 30(1) of the Public Order Act—were curable or whether they undermined the accused’s ability to understand and answer the case.
• Whether the absence of a complainant or identifiable victim renders the conviction for threatening language unsustainable.
• Whether the prosecution’s broad interpretation of “incitement” meets the legal threshold for intentional encouragement of a specific unlawful act.
• Whether prolonged pre‑trial detention and repeated denial of bail for a minor, bailable offence were proportionate and consistent with constitutional and international standards.
• Whether bail disparity between co‑accused persons raises legitimate equality‑before‑the‑law concerns.
• Whether administrative sanctions imposed by the PPRC amount to prior punishment, engaging double‑jeopardy protections under Section 23(9) of the Constitution.

These are not abstract questions. They are the precise issues that shape public confidence in the administration of justice. The High Court’s ruling will not only determine the fate of the appellant; it will also clarify how lower courts should approach political speech, charge formulation, bail discretion, and the boundaries of summary jurisdiction.

In moments like this, the integrity of judicial reasoning becomes as important as the verdict itself. The appeal invites the High Court to reaffirm that constitutional safeguards are not optional, that procedural fairness is not a technicality, and that the justice system’s legitimacy rests on its ability to apply the law consistently, proportionately, and without discrimination.

Whatever the outcome, the ruling will serve as a defining moment for how Sierra Leone’s courts navigate the intersection of public order, political expression, and constitutional rights.

Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr Author/ Blogger/Publisher